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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGIWI CITY SAND & GRAVEL, 
a corporation, GUY HIGLEY and 
KNOWLTOI~ BR0\11', 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
vs. 
MACH II~ERY CENTER, INC., VERA M. 
JENSEr~, and THE JENSEN TRUST, 
STERLING M. JENSEN, GWEN J. EMMETT 
JONES and IRENE J. SANFORD, 
Trustees , 
Defendant-Respondents, 
vs. 
R. J. HARRIS, HACH I NERY AIW 
LEASING COMPANY and R. J. HARRIS, 
Third Party Defendants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 16325 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit brought by Brigham City Sand and Gravel, et al., 
agai11st Defendant-Respondents, t\achinery Center, Inc., for return of personal 
property and against DefenJants, Vera t\. Jensen, and the Jensen Trust, 
SterliPg 11. Jensen, Gv1en J. Emmett Jones and Irene J. Sanford, Trustees, 
for the ,-etur• Jf pe,-sonal property, and in the alternative, for damages 
for the conv<Crsiun uf the per-sonal property. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon motion by counsel for Machinery Center, Inc., the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Judge, Third Judicial District, in and 
for Salt Lake County, Utah, dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff-Appellants' 
Camp I a i nt. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondents seek affirmance of the Lower Court's Order of 
Dismissal on the ground that no error was committed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Appellants' Statement of Facts fails to emphasize certain 
facts important to disposition of this matter. Defendant-Respondents, 
Machinery Center, Inc. (hereinafter Machinery Center) do not dispute the 
facts as stated, but present the following statements for purposes of 
clarification. 
Nachi nery Center purchased certain property from Third-Party Defendants, 
R.J. Harris Machinery and Leasing Company and R.J. Harris (hereinafter 
R. J. Harris) and received for said equipment a Bill of Sale in January, 1975. 
R. J. Harris had previously purchased the machinery from Vera M. Jensen and 
the Jensen Trust, Sterling f1. Jensen, Gwen J. Emmett Jones and I rene J. Sa11fnr•J. 
Trustees (h."einafter Jensen, et al.), in October, 1974. Jensens. cr al., dilege 
that the equipment had been abandoned by PlaintifF-Appel I ants, Brigham City 
Sand and Gravel, (hereinafter Plaintiff). The abandonment had occurred upon 
real property owned by the Trust. 
In 1977, Plaintiff brought suit against Machinery Center seeking 011iy rni 
return of the personal property. f1achinery Center, by way of Thi .-cl Pdrty Lor>~p' 
-2-
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brought suit against its vendor, R. J. Harris, seeking damages for breach 
of warranty of title should Plaintiff be successful in its suit. Plaintiff 
then amended its Complaint to bring suit against Jensens, et al., seeking 
return of the personal property or, in the alternative, damages in the sum of 
$12,000.00. In response, Jensens filed a Counterclaim against Plaintiff 
alleging trespass. At this juncture, R. J. Harris filed a Cross-Claim 
against Jensens, et al., praying for indemnification on any judgment recovered 
by Machinery Center. 
Prior to trial, Plaintiff executed a compromise settlement agreement, 
1·1hereby Jensens paid Plaintiffs $2,500,00 in settlement of all claims and 
under which Plaintiff agreed to indemnify Jensens for any liability which 
Jensens may incur as a result of R. J. Harris' Cross-Claim. 
Immediately prior to trial, ~1achinery Center moved the Trial Court 
for an Order of Dismissal upon the grounds that in settling the matter 
with Jensens, et al., Plaintiff had elected its remedy to pursue that of 
recovery of the va I ue of the property and should therefore be barred from 
seeking return of the property. Since Plaintiff had sued Defendant, 
11achinery Center, for the return of the property, and not for damages for 
conversion, the Trial Judge found that plaintiff had elected one of two 
inconsisLent remedies and that the remedy elected had been satisfied and 
therefore, dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice. 
ARGUHENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF, 
IN ELECTI~G AH INCONSISTENT REMEDY AND OBTAINING SATISFACTION 
THEREON, WAS BARRED FROM PURSUI~G AN ALTERNATIVE INCONSISTENT 
REMEDY. 
-3-
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The Trial Court, in its Judgment, states: 
.(in) accepting damages in the amount of $2,500.00 
from defendants, Jensen, et al., plaintiffs have elected a 
remedy of damages and have compromised and settled the said 
claim and are thereby precluded from pursuing the defendant, 
Machinery Center, Inc,, for the return of said property, 
which would result in double recovery •.• 
Judgment, page 2. So stating, the Court correctly applied the applicable 
law to the facts of this case. Plaintiffs brought suit against Machinery 
Center for return of specific property, a distinct common law remedy, and 
then subsequently brought suit against the Jensens, et al., for damages 
based on the theory of conversion and, in the alternative, for the return of 
the specific property (inconsistent remedies). They have elected one of the 
inconsistent remedies and, through settlement, have obtained satisfaction with 
respect to the elected remedy. 
Machinery Center does not contend that the Utah Rules of Civi 1 
Procedure do notal !ow pleading of inconsistent remedies in the alternative. 
Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civi I Procedure, clearly states that this practice is 
allowed. However, respondent does contend that Rule 8 has not abo! ished 
the Doctrine of Election of Remedies in the State of Utah. 
In the case of Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor Co., 69 Utah 161, 
253 P. 196 (1927), the Suj.lreme Court of Utah stated the rationale and 
application of Lhe doctrine of election of remedies. The Court explained: 
The doctrine of an election rests upon the principle 
LhaL one may not tAke contrary positions, dnd where he 
has a right to choose one of two modes of redress, and 
the t1~o are so inconsistent that the assertion of one 
involves a negation or repudiation of the other, the 
deliberate and settled choice of the one, with knowledge 
or means of knowledge of such facts as would authorize 
a resort to each, wi I 1 preclude him thereafter from 
going back and electing again. 
253 P. at 200, The Court further stated: 
-4-
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The true rule seems to be (I) that there must be, 
in fact, two or more coexisting remedies upon which 
the party has the right to elect; (2) the remedies thus 
open to him must be alternative and inconsistent; and 
(3) he must by actually bringing an action or by some 
other decisive act, with knowledge of the facts, indicate 
his choice between these inconsistent remedies. 
253 P. at 199. 
The Court of Civi I Appeals of Texas, in the case of National 
Surety Co. et al. v. Odie, et al., 40 SW 2d 876, (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1931) 
dealt with the problem of applying the doctrine of election of remedies 
to a case involving facts similar to the case now before the Court. 
In this decision, Odie had brought suit in a Justice Court to recover a specific 
bale of cotton or, in the alternative, to recover its value. Under a 
Writ of Sequestration, the bale was seized by the constable. Odie 
recovered judgment for the cotton bale or, in the alternative, its value. 
Judgment directed the constable to deliver the bale to Odie, Odie then 
brought suit in County Court on a conversion theory and recovered a money 
judgment. The Appeals Court allowed Odie to recover costs not recovered 
in the Justice Court, but refused to allow recovery for the bale's value. 
In its decision, the Court explained: 
Plaint iff had at his election two remedies for redress 
of the injury r~sul ting from the theft of the bale of cotton 
in controversy in this c~se. One of such remedies was to 
sue for the recovery of the specific property. The other 
was to treat the possession thereof by defendants, and their 
refusal to surrender thce same on demand, as a conversion, 
dnd sue for the value thereof. Such remedies were incon-
sistent, and the assert ion of one was necessarily a waiver 
uf the other, exc~pt in the alternative that the remedy first 
sought had proved unavailable. A suit for specific property 
involves a pprsist~.1t and continuing claim by the plaintiff 
_cJ_f___t_iJJ_c:__!_u the prop...:o:..t..Lsued for and invokes the aid of the 
-5-
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court to effect its restoration. A suit for· conversion 
treats the unlawful acts of appropriation by the defen-
dant as having divested the plaintiff of his title and 
invokes the aid of the court to secure compensation 
therefor bT an award of its value as damages in I ieu 
thereof. Emphasis added) 
40 SW 2d at 877. The Court found that Odie had elcected his remedies ''!c'" 1 J, 
constable had seized the bale on Odie's behalf under the ~lrit and thal c''''-' 
Odie technically had obtained the return of the bale and therefore had uh '""' 
satisfaction of the Justice Court Judgment, he was barred from bringing rile 
new suit for conversion. 
In this matter, Plaintiff-Appellants have brought suit against 
Machinery Center for the return of the specific property in question. 
As stated in Odie,~ this suit involves a claim that title to the 
property has remaineu in the plaintiff. Plaintiff then amended its Cornplcrrr,, 
to bring suit against the Jensens, et al., to return the specific equipmcrlt 
or, in the alter~atr;c, fCJr oamages for conversion. Conversion treats 
the acts of defen•:ur'lo "s divesting plaintiff of title and seeks conJpcw __ ,,_,,, 
for the property's value. In the acceptance of money damages, pursuant to 
the compromise agreement with Jensens, Plaintiff has clearly taken action 
constiLuling an election bet\'Jeen two inconsistent remedies, and has obluifled 
satisi'action of the elected remedy. As stated in Cook, supra, Plain1 iff hds 
indicated his choice betc-1een inconsistent remedies by takin9 the decio< '''·' 
of settling for damages 1vi thout obtaining a return of the property frcn 
Jensens, e t a 1. 
The compromise and settlement of a suit constitutes such an 
election as wi II preclude plaintiff from the•eafter prosecu! i11'; 
an action upon d theory inconsistent with that on which the 
former action v1as maintained. 
-6-
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28 C.J.S. Election of Remedies, Section II. Therefore, in making this 
election, Plaintiff is thereafter barred from seeking the inconsistent 
remedy of return of the property from t1achinery Center. 
Plaintiffs are correct in quoting Farmers and Merchants Bank v. 
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation, 4 Ut. 2d 155, 289 P.2d 1049 (1955) for 
the applicable law to be applied under the doctrine of election of remedies. 
However, Plaintiffs are mistaken as to Universal C.t.T.'s application to 
the facts herein, As. pointed out in~~' the remedies of return of 
specific property and of damages for conversion are clearly inconsistent 
remedies due to their reliance upon inconsistent facts. To recover on the 
theory of return of property, Plaintiffs. must show that title remained in 
Plaintiffs. To recover on a conversion theory, Plaintiffs must show 
that title has been divested from Plaintiffs by Defendants' actions. Since 
Plaintiffs have elected by a settlement with Jensens., et al. to settle on 
the basis of the conversion theory, Plaintiffs. cannot now allege inconsistent 
facts necessary to support a c I aim for return of the property against 
~chinery Center, since the settlement of the elected remedy operates as 
~judicata with respect to the facts supporting the elected remedy of 
damages for conversion. 
Plaintiffs state that the settlement has been engineered in such 
rll'lay that double recovery wi II not occur. Plaintiff sets out three scenarios 
J'; quidance for the Trial Court. However, Plaintiff has failed to realize 
:hat the causes of action betwecen the various parties are not so interrelated 
that the findings on the different matters wi II fall into I ine under a 
'co11i11u theory", Any attempt to avoid the bar of election of remedies by 
'he Pldi11tiff should hd'Jc beer, r~<adc before settlement and not at this 
•lvr ·lot<: by 1 he dcvelclP"'""t of scenarios. 
-?-
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PO I NT I I 
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION OF REMEDIES TO 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE IS CONSISTENT WITH EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS. 
The suit before the Court was precipitated by the neg I igent act i""' 
of the Plaintiff, Brigham City Sand and Gravel. According to Jensens, el al 
mvners of the real property upon which the equipment was located, the equi 1 ""~r,: 
had been abandoned and unused from 19GB until 1:174, a pel-iod of six years. 
Jensens, et al. also understood that the City of Brigham was insisting th.,l 
steps be taken to remove the equipment which constituted a hazard to chi ldt.' 
who played in the area. (R.30) Plaintiff, Higley, admits that the propcn 1 
was last operated in 1970. (R. 79) His Answers to the Interrogatories ·11Sc> 
show that although he I ived in f·1antua, Utah, approximately five rni les fro111 'he 
location of the equipment, Higley did not discover that the property had b~en 
removed until Sprin·J, :~:75. (R, 01) R. J. Harris had purchased the equil''"'"'t 
in October, 1974, more than six months prior to the date of Higley's Jiscovc·t,. 
(R. 54) By the time Plaintiff had discovered the sale to harris. the eq~tic>ntent 
had been sold to the Defendant, 11achinery Center. (R. 24) Machine,-y c~nlt't 
had purchased the equipment after checking with the Secretary of Stale to 
determine if there were security interest fi I ings against the equirment "n.J 
r~eceived d lli II of Sale for the equipment. (R. 24) 
t1achinery Center ,~ecognizes th<Jt under certdin ci,-cumstunces~, .. 1 ·: 
of the Doctrine of Elect io11 of Remedies can produce harsh results, urld r I',· 
consequently, courts are sensitive LO equitable principle' in a~pl'i;"'~ 
the doctrine. However, the facts shown above clearly i11Jicate tlt<~l rh,~ 
in this matter I ie vlith t1achinery Center. 
-3-
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Clearly, the equitable maxim that "equity aids one who has been vigilant" 
should apply to the facts of this case for the benefit of the Defendant, 
11ach i nery Center. If Plaintiffs had taken the steps necessary to properly 
notify the parties, especially Jensens, et al., that the property was not 
abandoned, either in writing or through actions, rather than remaining silent 
for a period of five or six years, the conversion by Jensens, et al., would 
not have occurred. 1·\oreover, if Plaintiffs had been vigilant in their care 
and maintenance of the property, they could have discovered the fact of 
Jensens, et al., sale of the property soon after its occurrence, and 
cherefore, could have prevented the subsequent sale to Machinery Center, 
an innocent party and bona fide purchaser without notice. 
The equities ti It in Machinery Center's favor when the maxim 
"equity wi II help only those who help themselves" is applied. Under the 
circumstances of this case, Plaintiffs had within their control, all of the 
avenues to protect their property from the conversion that occurred. Since 
Plaintiffs' omission precipitated the circumstances resulting in Pia inti ffs' 
claim for damages, one must conclude that the equities favor Machinery Center 
since it purchased without notice, for value, from a dealer in the regular 
oourse uf business, after making prudent inquiries regarding the existence 
If this maxim is follmveJ, the Court should hesi :dte to 
'''" :,ction to 1·cscue Plaintiffs from the circumstances which have resulterl 
frun·1 ! he it o~Jn dC t ions. 
If th,, Cou,·t concludes that equitable considerations are 3pplicable, 
-9-
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the Court should bear in mind that Plaintiffs have received $2,500 from 
Jensens, et al., in settlemeni. To refuse to apply the Doctrine of 
Election of Remedies wi 11 ~I low Plaintiffs to recover both damages and the 
property, a circumstance which the Doctrine of Election of Remedies was 
developed to avoid. Indeed, this case is one for the application of the 
Doctrine of the Election of Remedies. Plaintiffs' failure to act prudently 
has created a situation under which Machinery Center, an innocent purchaser, 
would suffer damage. Plaintiffs' voluntary election of an inconsistent remedy, 
damages, and the settlement thereof, should bar further claim to the property. 
"'' The Court should, therefore, refuse to extricate Plaintiff from a situation 
caused by Plaintiffs' own actions. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court was correct in holding that Plaintiff had made an 
elect ion of remedies an,J was thereby barred from pursuing an alternative 
inconsistent remedy against Respondents. In compromising and settling the 
case on a conversion-damages theory, Plaintiff has clearly taken steps 
showing an election between the conversion-damages theory and the alternative, 
but inconsistent, return of specific property theory. Case law c ]early supporcs 
the Trial Judge's finding that due to Plaintiffs' election, and satisfaction. 
Pl.::i"t.iffs are barred from §Peking return of th:e property. Furlhtel', tlw 
eqt~ities clearly preponderate in favor of an application of the Doctrine 
of []ection of Rert1edies and the Judgment of the Lower Courl should be 
affirmed. 
-10-
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Res.e__ectfully submitted this 
.!:? 7· day of June, 1979. 
Roy G. Haslam 
Biele, Haslam & Hatch 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
Machinery Center, Inc, 
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Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellants 
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Attorney for Defendants, Jones, Sanford, 
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